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The Greatest Difficulty at Parmenides 133c-134e and Plato’s relative terms0 
 
The first part of Plato’s Parmenides bombards the theory of Forms with objections. 
Parmenides singles out one criticism as the ‘Greatest Difficulty’ (hereafter ‘GD’) and 
presents it at Parmenides 133c-134e. The argument has received some attention but 
scholars generally think that it does not pose a threat to the theory of Forms, either 
because it is not formally valid, or, if it is formally valid, because it begs the question 
against the Platonist. This paper aims to show that the GD is a serious challenge to the 
theory of Forms, neither invalid, at least for the reasons usually given, nor question- 
begging.  
To understand how the GD poses a threat, we need to understand how Plato 
thinks of relative terms, with which the GD is concerned. We discover that the Forms 
are otiose when saying in virtue of what a relative comes to be the relative that it is.1 
Roughly put: for Plato each relative term, such as master, has a correlative to which it 
exclusively and exhaustively relates. So when we come to say in virtue of what a 
relative is the relative it is, we need to mention only its correlative and not a Form. 
For example, if Achilles is a master, he is a master in virtue of his relationship to 
Briseis, not to the Form Master. Because of a peculiarity in Plato’s view of relatives, 
                                                
I would like to thank warmly David Sedley, James Warren and Tamer Nawar for comments 
on earlier drafts and the editor of this series for suggesting improvements to the final version.  
1 I use the expression ‘in virtue of’ to reflect an important distinction here between causal 
explanations and non-causal explanations. Causal explanations answer a why question by 
pointing to a world-level causal relationship between items. The window broke because a ball 
hit it. But explanations need not point to a relationship like this. Why are all biologists 
scientists? It seems that it is in virtue of the non-causal relationship between biologists and 
scientists, not because of any causal relationship between them. This piece is primarily 
concerned with an explanation of this latter sort. In virtue of what is a relative the relative that 
it is? Answering this question is independent of explaining how, for example, the Form 
master may cause a participant master to be a master. It is often thought that the Forms offer 
causal explanations of the properties of their participants, but I do not rely on that claim and 
will not argue for it here. 
 
2 
relatives only relate to their correlative; for Plato, relative terms have a special and 
unique relationship to a correlative term. Thus, Achilles can only be master of things 
in this realm. With appropriate changes, the same considerations isolate the Form 
Master as master only of the Form Slave. So the GD rules out the relation of relative 
terms to correlatives in another realm. The difficulty is serious because it entails that 
we cannot know the Forms, and that the gods cannot know our affairs or be our 
masters. 
 In section 1, I will outline the main approaches to the GD in the literature. The 
first approach, styled ‘the radical separation reading’, takes it that the GD assumes 
total separation of the Forms from participants. I reject this reading as begging the 
question against the Platonist. I reject an older view, that the GD is an argument from 
analogy, because that reading makes the GD an obvious fallacy. In section II, I will 
introduce my own reading, which vindicates the argument, but avoids the problems 
that dog the existing readings. I develop a much richer understanding of Plato’s 
notion of relative terms and show how that supports my view.  
 
1. Existing Approaches to the GD 
 
If Socrates is correct that there are Forms, then his proposal must account for the 
relationship between Forms and participants. Two candidates for the relationship, 
sharing and resembling, are examined at 131a-e and 132d-133b respectively. Both 
accounts of the relationship fail. Then, at 133c–134e, Parmenides presents the young 
Socrates’ theory of Forms with the ‘Greatest Difficulty’. This difficulty focuses on the 
separation of Forms and participants. Parmenides invokes two pairs of relative terms: 
the master–slave pair (133d7–134a1) and the knowledge–truth pair (134a3–b1). He 
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concludes, so I will argue, that we cannot be masters of the Form Slave, we cannot 
know the Form Truth and the gods cannot master us or know our affairs. The text of 
the argument is as follows:  
 
(P1) Because, Socrates, I think that you, and anyone else who posits 
that there is some essence of each thing itself by itself (ὅστις αὐτήν 
τινα καθ' αὑτὴν ἑκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι), would agree, first, 
that none of them is among us (ἐν ἡμῖν) (133c3–5). 
 
 (P2) Therefore, all the Ideas which are what they are in relation to 
each other (ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἵ εἰσιν) have their 
essence (οὐσίαν) in relation to themselves (πρὸς αὑτάς), not in 
relation to the things among us, by partaking in which we are called 
after each of them, whether one posits these as likenesses or in some 
other way (133c8–d2). 
 
(P3) But these things among us (τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα) which have 
the same names as each of those, are, again, themselves in relation to 
themselves but not in relation to the Forms (πρὸς αὑτά ἐστιν ἀλλ' οὐ 
πρὸς τὰ εἴδη), and all the things which are named in this way are of 
themselves and not of those things (133c8–d5).   
 
The construal of this highly compressed argument is contentious. Indeed, there is no 
agreement as to what the principal conclusion is supposed to be, let alone whether the 
GD validly derives its conclusion. One answer is that the GD aims to show that there 
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is radical separation of Forms from participants: the unknowability of the Forms 
would follow as a corollary of this radical separation. I reject this ‘radical separation’ 
reading because if it were correct the GD would become an unexplained petitio 
principii. Another answer I discount is that the GD aims to show that the Forms are 
unknowable by an argument from analogy. It fails because the GD actually has four 
significant consequences, not just one. But let us begin with the radical separation 
reading. 
 
1.1 Radical separation   
 
The key issue concerning validity is precisely how we take the ‘principle of 
separation’ which is, arguably, relied upon by the GD.2 Those who think that the 
argument is valid typically think that P1 and P2 amount to the claim that ‘separation 
is radical’:3   
 
                                                
2 Even if I am correct and the argument relies on a principle of separation between Forms and 
participants, there is no agreement on which of several possible principles of separation is 
relied upon in the argument. To see the diversity of approach, compare F. M. Cornford, Plato 
and Parmenides: Parmenides’ Way of Truth and Plato’s Parmenides. Translated with 
Commentary [Plato and Parmenides], (London, 1939), 99; H. F. Cherniss, Aristotle’s 
Criticism of Plato and the Academy [Criticism] (London, 1962), vol. 1, 284; W. G. Runciman 
Plato’s Later Epistemology [Epistemology] (Cambridge, 1962, 159); W. J. Prior, Unity and 
Development in Plato’s Metaphysics [Unity] (LaSalle, 1985), 75–6; M.M. McCabe Plato’s 
Individuals [Individuals] (Princeton, 1999), 91; M. L. Gill and P. Ryan. Parmenides 
[Parmenides] (Indianapolis, 1996), 46; R.E. Allen, Plato’s Parmenides [Plato's Parmenides] 
(Newhaven, 1998), 193; S. Peterson, 'The Greatest Difficulty for Plato’s Theory of Forms: 
The Unknowability Argument of Parmenides 133c—134c' ['Greatest'], Archiv Für 
Geschichte Der Philosophie 63 (1981), 1–16 and S. Rickless, Plato’s Forms in Transition: a 
Reading of the Parmenides [Transition] (Cambridge, 2007), 85-93. 
3 Allen, Plato’s Parmenides, 193. A similar line on separation, if not validity, is taken by 
Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, 99; Cherniss, Criticism, 284; Runciman, Epistemology, 159; 
McCabe, Individuals, 91; Prior, Unity, 75–6 and Gill, Parmenides, 46. 
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(RS) For all X, for all Y, X is a form and X bears a relation to Y iff Y is a form.4 
 
This radical separation of Forms from participants is the strongest possible reading of 
the separation premise. The premise proves the conclusion that we cannot know the 
Forms, as long as we hold that ‘knows’ is a relation. Such a proof is as follows: (i) the 
knowledge we have is not a Form, (ii) the knowledge we have knows (or is 
knowledge of) something, Y. So, by RS, (iii) Y must be a non-Form. Therefore, (iv) 
anything that we know must be a non-Form. The GD is valid, provided we accept that 
there is an object to which knowledge relates.5  
 But RS exacts too great a price for a valid construal of the argument. A 
Platonist would not accept a premise that denies all relations between Forms and 
participants.6 If the argument relies on such a strong premise, then it begs the 
question. One may wish to retain RS and explain why Parmenides says that an off-
target attack is the greatest difficulty with the theory of Forms. Perhaps one could 
appeal to the several passages in the first part of the Parmenides where Socrates may 
accept premises which a more mature theorist would not (for example, at 130b; 130e–
131e, esp. 131b; 132a).     
 Even if we found some way to satisfy ourselves that the GD deliberately 
begs the question, we ought to reject the radical separation reading on the basis of the 
text alone. The sentence at 133d1–2 mentions three kinds of relation which may hold 
between Forms and participants, namely, the relations ‘…participates in…’, ‘…is 
                                                
4 This is a biconditional, which is not explicitly formulated in the text. A closer reflection of 
what is taken as the source for these remarks, 133c3-5, would be two conditionals: (RS1) For 
all X, for all Y, if X is a form and X bears a relation to Y then Y is a form, and (RS2) For all X, 
for all Y, if X is among us and X bears a relation to Y then Y is among us. Assuming that every 
item is either a Form, or among us, the biconditional (RS) follows from the conjunction of 
(RS1) and (RS2).   
5 There is a non-relational sense of ἐπιστήμη in Greek, meaning something like a field of 
expertise. But this is obviously not the sense at stake in the GD. 
6 See Prior, Unity, 75. 
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like…’ and ‘…is named after…’.7 If, as is implied by that sentence, some relations 
can obtain across the realms, then separation is not radical. In short, the radical 
separation reading validates the GD, but also makes it an off-target attack that does 
not respect the specific details of the argument in the text.  
 
1.2 The argument-from-analogy reading 
 
If the radical separation reading is not persuasive, we might have recourse to an older 
construal of the argument. Many concur with Cornford’s remark that the GD is 
‘almost grossly fallacious’.8 They usually follow Forrester’s construal of the argument 
as an argument from analogy:9 
 
1. The Form Master is a master, the Form Slave is a slave; 
2. Of what is the Form Master a master? There are three possibilities:  
a. Particular slaves; 
b. Participants in the Form Master; 
c. The Form Slave. 
3. The Form Master cannot master (a), since (a) are slaves of particular masters; 
4. The Form Master cannot master (b), since (b) are masters, not slaves; 
5. So, the Form Master must be master of (only) the Form Slave. 
                                                
7 εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅπῃ δή τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, ὧν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες εἶναι ἕκαστα 
ἐπονομαζόμεθα. Parmenides, 133d1-2 
8 Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, 98. See also J.W. Forrester 'Arguments and (sic) Able 
Man Colud (sic) Refute: Parmenides 133b-134e' [‘Arguments’], Phronesis (1974), 233–237; 
F.A. Lewis 'Parmenides on Separation and the Knowability of the Forms: Plato Parmenides 
133a ff' [‘Separation’], Philosophical Studies 35 (1979), 105–127; I. Mueller, 'Parmenides 
133a-134e: Some Suggestions', Ancient Philosophy 3 (1983), 3–7. 
9 Forrester, ‘Arguments’, 234. 
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6. Just as the Form Master must be Master of the Form Slave, so too the Form 
Knowledge must know only the Form Truth.10 
7. From (5), humans cannot master the Form Slavery.  
8. From (6) and (7), humans cannot know the Form Truth. 
9. Therefore, humans cannot know the Forms. 
 
For this argument from analogy to hold, the master-slave case needs to be relevantly 
similar to the knowledge-truth case in such a way as to show that, just as a human 
master cannot master the Form Slave, so human knowledge cannot know the Form 
Truth. But, according to those who follow this reading, the analogy between the 
master-slave case and the knowledge-truth case breaks down.11 It is clear a priori that 
a master must be master of a slave, who has certain characteristics that the Form Slave 
cannot have, e.g. being mortal. A human master must be master of something mortal. 
But the categorical properties of the Forms include being non-mortal. So the 
categorical properties of the Form Slave prevent it from being mastered by a human 
master.12 However, the term ‘knowledge’ does not have such restrictions: there is no 
reason that knowledge cannot hold between a human and a Form, since being 
knowable is a categorical property of the Forms. The argument invalidly moves from 
a case where the categorical properties prevent a cross-realm relation to a case where 
the categorical properties do not do so. Therefore, the GD is invalid.  
                                                
10 Truth is the Form which Parmenides specifies as the correlative of the Form Knoweldge. 
Forrester, ‘Arguments’, 235 glosses this as the Form Object-of-Knowledge. 
11 Forrester, ‘Arguments’, 236–7, Lewis 'Separation', 112. 
12 Categorical properties of Forms are those which a Form has simply in virtue of being a 
Form, rather than being the Form it happens to be. See Owen, G. E. L. Dialectic and Eristic 
in the Treatment of the Forms, (Oxford, 1968). 
. 
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 This cannot be the correct way to read the argument, since, as I will now 
argue, there are four philosophical conclusions to the argument, each derived in the 
same way, not one conclusion concerning masters and slaves which provides the 
model for the conclusion concerning knowledge. Overwhelmingly, scholars have 
thought that the main conclusion is an epistemic difficulty: that the Forms cannot be 
known (133b4-6, 134b11-c2).13 Some have also emphasised that there is a second 
epistemic conclusion, which may be problematic for a Platonist, namely, that the 
divine, or the gods, would not be able to know human matters (134e5-6).14 
Parmenides calls this conclusion ‘astonishing’ (θαυμαστός) (134e7). I argue that 
these epistemic conclusions do not exhaust the problems generated by the GD and 
that a Platonist would find the conclusion concerning vassalage, that the divine cannot 
be our master, equally problematic. We will read the argument differently, if we 
recognise that it has four consequences: (i) that the divine cannot master the human, 
(ii) that the human cannot master the divine, (iii) that the divine cannot know the 
human (iv) that the human cannot know the divine.15 If the argument were an 
argument from analogy, then only the epistemic conclusions would be philosophically 
interesting. But, it cannot be an argument from analogy if both sorts of conclusion are 
important. 
 While it is agreed on all sides that conclusion (iv) would be unacceptable to 
Plato, (i) would also be problematic for him.16 At Phaedo 62d2–3 a conception of the 
divine is found such that we are its possessions (κτήματα) and it is our manager (τὸ 
                                                
13 Forrester 'Arguments', 233, Peterson 'Greatest', 1, Rickless ‘Transition’, 90.    
14 Lewis 'Separation', 120–123, M.L. McPherran, 'An Argument 'Too Strange’: Parmenides 
134c4-e8', Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 32 (1999), 55–71; 
Rickless 'Transition', 90–93. 
15 Plato would surely hold that (ii) is an obvious truth and so, although the GD entails (ii), we 
should perhaps avoid calling it a conclusion: Plato would see no need to argue for (ii).  
16 I owe to David Sedley the parallel with Phaedo 62d. Although it seems obvious, no 
literature I am aware of says that (i) would be problematic for the Platonist. 
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θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν). Platonic piety, it seems, would be 
outraged by the conclusion (i). Since the conclusions (i), (iii) and (iv) are all 
philosophically threatening, the master-slave example is not introduced simply on the 
way to the damaging conclusions (iii) and (iv). 
 Textual evidence from the Parmenides supports this. 134d9-e6 summarises 
the overall conclusions of the GD. The sentence begins with οὐκοῦν, Plato’s usual 
term for drawing a conclusion, and proceeds to give the conditional ‘if this most 
accurate mastery and this most accurate knowledge are in the divine realm, then their 
mastery could not master us, nor their knowledge know us nor anything else among 
us’ (134d9-e1). Nothing grammatical indicates that an analogy is being drawn 
between the example of mastery and the example of knowledge: in fact, the 
conjunction καί at 134d10 is most naturally taken as balancing the two examples, not 
subordinating one to the other.  
Plato does move on to draw an analogy, using the term ὁμοίως, at 134e1. But 
the analogy drawn is not between the examples of mastery and knowledge, but rather 
between the divine and the human: ‘just as we do not command them (sc. the gods) 
with our leadership, nor know the divine with our knowledge, so they, in turn, 
according to the argument, are not masters of us, nor do they know human affairs, 
because they are gods’ (134e2-6). The language Plato uses suggests that the analogy 
holds between the abilities of the human and divine, not between the examples of 
mastery and knowledge. Therefore, the conclusions (i), (iii) and (iv) each seem 
philosophically important and ought to be read as deriving from isomorphic 
10 
reasoning.17 The GD is not an argument from analogy, so is not invalid, at least for the 
reasons Forrester gives.   
 The two dominant readings both have serious drawbacks. If we take 
separation as a premise in the GD, as we must, separation cannot be radical. 
Moreover, the GD should be valid, contrary to the argument from analogy reading, 
with four philosophically significant consequences. In section 2, I show that such a 
reading is not only possible, but also highly plausible.  
 
2. Relative terms and the GD 
 
We saw above that the existing readings of the GD are unsatisfactory and we might 
wish to remind ourselves of the criteria for a successful reading of the GD. My 
discussion of the radical separation reading showed that separation must be strong 
enough to motivate the conclusion that the Form Master can relate only to the Form 
Slave, not to some participant slave, and vice versa. The same applies, mutatis 
mutandis for Knowledge and Truth. But the premise must also not be so strong as to 
rule out a priori all relations between Forms and participants, as this would beg the 
question against the Platonist. The failure of the argument-from-analogy reading 
taught us to understand the argument as a valid derivation of all four consequences, 
not just the epistemic consequences.  
                                                
17 If conclusions (i), (iii) and (iv) are philosophically important, Plato is not picking his 
examples of relatives at random, or deriving them from another source. This is significant 
because if Plato’s examples are deliberate, Aristotle’s use of ‘master’ and ‘slave’ as examples 
of relatives in Cat. 7 indicates that he was influenced directly by this passage in his thinking 
about relatives. If, contrary to fact, Plato had picked the example of ‘master’ and ‘slave’ 
without a philosophical point, it might have suggested that Plato and Aristotle were both 
following an existing (perhaps shared) tradition.  
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 A proper understanding of P2, and the notion of relative terms contained 
within it, allows us to navigate the waters between these requirements. I take the GD 
as a reductio of a separation assumption that P1 and P2 express: such a separation 
assumption leads to consequences, three of which are unacceptable, when combined 
with various assumptions about relatives. P1 asserts that (a) each thing has an essence 
that is ‘itself by itself’ and (b) none of those essences are among us. P2 applies this 
thinking to a class of Forms: those that ‘are what they are in relation to each other’. It 
asserts that (c) members of this class have their essence in relation to themselves and 
not in relation to things among us. Parmenides then repeats, in P3, the complementary 
point for the things among us. Formally, I claim that texts P1-P3 reflect the following 
principles, and that the GD targets them for reductio: 
 
(A) For all X, for all Y, (if (X is a Form and X has Y as its reciprocating correlative) 
then Y is a Form). 
 
As suggested by P3, there is an equivalent principle governing participants: 
 
(B) For all X, for all Y, (if (X is among us and X has Y as a reciprocating correlative) 
then Y is among us).  
 
Given the assumption that Forms and things among us exhaust the ontology, these 
two principles yield the following biconditional: 
 
(AB) For all X, for all Y, ((X is a Form and X has Y as its reciprocating correlative) iff 
Y is a Form). 
12 
 
Note that AB does not bar all relations between Forms and participants: specifically, 
it does not rule out every version of the participation relation. The only thing that it 
blocks is having a reciprocating correlation between Forms and participants. We will 
see below what a reciprocating correlative is, for Plato. But, taken with certain 
assumptions about relative terms, AB yields the four consequences, three of which are 
unacceptable to the Platonist: one concerning vassalage and two concerning 
epistemology. Roughly this is because Plato’s conception of relative terms entails that 
a given relative is that relative in virtue of its correlative. It is only in virtue of the 
relationship a master has to a correlative slave that a master is a master. By AB, the 
relative-correlative relationship cannot hold across realms, which, as we will see 
below, leads to the four conclusions. 
For my reading to succeed, I must first establish that A and B best reflect the 
text of P1-P3. A close reading of P2 helps to do this. P2 tells us what characteristics 
those Forms that are to be isolated from participants should have. These 
characteristics are precisely the ones required for (A) and (B). P2 specifies a restricted 
class of Forms and asserts things about those Forms. The class picked out is ‘all the 
Ideas which are what they are in relation to each other’ (ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς 
ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἵ εἰσιν). Contrary to the radical separation reading, which takes this 
as a delineation of all the Forms, my reading recognises that only some Forms can be 
picked out this way: Forms for relative terms. This is what the ὅσαι indicates.18 But 
what are the characteristics of the Forms for relatives that are thus identified?  
The first thing that is clear is that relatives are not singletons. No one could be 
a slave if they were the only item in the universe. Obviously, it is necessary but not 
                                                
18 Lewis, ‘Separation’, 107 also holds that a restricted class of Forms are picked out here. 
13 
sufficient for being a slave that there are other items in the universe. Someone is not a 
slave if the other item that exists is merely a man, for example. A special relationship 
to another item is necessary. To be a slave is to bear a special relationship to a master. 
If a master exists, then there must be a slave and vice versa. This does not hold with 
other terms, such as ‘man’: if a man exists, it does not follow that there must be a 
slave, or anything else. One might think that relative terms come in pairs. This fits 
with the examples cited in the GD: Master/Slave and Knowledge/Truth. We have 
already seen that the first term in this pair is usually called a relative term, the other 
its correlative.   
Not only do relatives and their correlatives come in pairs, but also the pair is 
of a special sort. This is a further indication that A and B are the correct reading of 
P2. Parmenides tells us, at 133c8, that the terms in the pair are in relation to each 
other (πρὸς ἀλλήλας). We might call the pair ‘reciprocal’. Just as a master is master 
of a slave, so a slave is slave of a master.19 We could put the point, somewhat 
anachronistically, by using the notion of a relation and its converse in modern logic.20 
The domain of a relation, R, is the set of all of the items that bear R to something. We 
can say that the co–domain of R is the set of all items which have R borne to them. 
                                                
19 cf. Aristotle Cat. 7 6b28-7a21. Aristotle is very clear that relatives reciprocate (6b28–35) 
and even uses as examples master and slave (6b29–30) and knowledge (6b34–5), which I 
mentioned above, are taken directly from this passage. Here, and in what follows, I draw 
illustrative comparisons with Aristotle’s discussion of relatives in Categories 7. Although 
none of my arguments rely on Aristotle’s texts as evidence, such comparisons are peritnent 
because Plato and Aristotle seem to handle relatives in much the same way. Both conceive of 
relatives as having a correlative which it is exclusively relative to. Both think of relatives 
reciprocating with their correaltive. Both pick many of the same examples. Compare 
Charmides 167c–168c, Republic 438b–e and Theaetetus 152a–c with Categories 6a36–8b24 
to see double and half, larger and smaller, knowledge and perception used by both 
philosophers as examples of relatives, in addition to master and slave, which we have been 
discussing. While there are some differences (e.g. for Aristotle relatives admit of contraries, 
Cat. 7 6b15–18, a point not discussed by Plato), the similarities are strong enough to make the 
comparisons illuminating.  
20 Although the analogy is useful, there are, I believe very important differences in the way 
Plato and Aristotle conceive of relative terms and the way modern logic does. Principally, 
Plato and Aristotle lack the idea of a dyadic relation. 
14 
These notions also allow us to define the converse of a relation, R. The converse of R 
is R–1, defined as the relation which takes the co–domain of R as its domain and which 
has the domain of R as its co–domain. This allows us to describe in more detailed 
language what Parmenides is saying here: the co–domain of the ‘is a master’ relation 
consists exclusively of slaves.21 So the terms ‘master’ and ‘slave’ reciprocate because 
the domain of the ‘is a master of’ relation is the co-domain of the ‘is a slave of’ 
relation and vice versa.22 
Plato holds, right across his corpus, that each relative term has a reciprocating 
correlative to which it is related. Republic IV gives us a rich selection of examples in 
the context of a discussion of relative terms: 
 
Don’t you understand that the greater is the sort of thing to be of or 
than something? Of course. Surely, greater than the smaller? Yes. And, 
perhaps, the much greater than the much smaller: isn’t that right? Yes. 
So is the at–a–time (ποτέ) greater than the at–a–time smaller and the 
going–to–be (ἐσόμενον) greater to than the going–to–be smaller? 
Certainly, said he. And similarly the more in relation to the fewer, and 
the double in relation to the half and all like cases; again, the heavier in 
relation to the lighter, the faster in relation to the slower and moreover, 
perhaps, the hot in relation to the cold: surely it is also like that for all 
similar cases? But what about knowledges? Isn’t it the same way? 
                                                
21 Lewis, ‘Separation’, 110 also invokes these modern notions, but in an analysis quite 
different to mine.  
22 Note the difference between ‘symmetrical’ relations and reciprocal relations. ‘Symmetry’ is 
a property of first-order relations, while reciprocity is a relation between first-order relations. 
It is easy to see the difference when we look at cases such as ‘larger’. ‘Larger’ is not 
symmetrical, because if x is larger than y, it is not the case that y is larger than x. But ‘larger’ 
does have a reciprocal, i.e. ‘smaller’. 
15 
Knowledge itself is knowledge of learning (μαθήματος) itself – or of 
whatever we ought to posit that knowledge is of…(438b4-c9) 
 
In each case, Socrates gives the relative term as relative to its reciprocating partner: 
just as the relative relates to its correlative, so the correlative relates to the relative. 
Nor is this way of presenting relatives and correlatives confined to the Republic: 
greater and smaller are given in this way in the Charmides (168b5–8) and Categories 
7 (6a36–b10). Double and half are so given in the Charmides (168c4–5) and 
Categories 7 (7a15–17). Heavier and lighter feature thus in the Charmides (168c9–
10). Desire is a relative in Symposium (200a5) as well as the Charmides (167e1–2). 
Finally, knowledge is mentioned as a relative with a correlative in Charmides 
(168b2–3), Categories 7 (6a36–b10; 6b28–35; 7b15ff) and Parmenides (134a–b), 
although in each case, ‘knowledge’ has a different reciprocating correlative. So each 
relative term has a reciprocating correlative. This is reflected by A and B, showing 
them to be a good reading of P2 and P3. 
AB is a good reading of the premise targeted for reductio by the GD. But to 
prove my reading of the GD, I need to show that relative terms, for Plato, do not just 
have a reciprocating correlative, but also that the reciprocating correlative is the 
object of the relative. Plato asserts this in the case of ‘knowledge’ at Republic 438c9. 
The ‘knowledge’ relation takes an item in the domain, a knower, and links it to an 
item in the co-domain of the relation. Each item in the ‘co-domain’ is an object of 
knowledge: each is something known. The special object is what can be applied to the 
whole co-domain of a given relative: where the relative is ‘knowledge’ the object is 
all the known things. Plato changes the expression he uses for ‘object of knowledge’, 
but the notion is stable enough: not only is the known the correlative of knowledge, 
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but it is also its object. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to other relative-
correlative pairs. 
In the Parmenides, Socrates’ interrogator has more to say about the Forms that 
come in reciprocating relative and correlative pairs. As well as coming in such a pair, 
they ‘are what they are’ (εἰσὶν αἵ εἰσιν) in relation to each other. For some scholars 
this indicates that Forms of relative terms feature other Forms in their definition.23 
However, I think that the expression εἰσὶν αἵ εἰσιν means something rather specific in 
the context of relative terms. εἰσὶν αἵ εἰσιν serves as the feminine plural form of a 
neuter singular expression often found in Plato’s discussions of relative terms: ὅπερ 
ἔστιν. The expression occurs at Parmenides 133c8 in the feminine plural, rather than 
the usual neuter singular, because it agrees with the feminine plural τῶν ἰδεῶν in the 
same line. Looking at some comparable uses of this expression in Plato will reveal 
that it is used to specify that a relative reciprocates with its correlative when the 
relative is properly specified and that the correlative is the object of the relative.  
The Symposium contains an apparently technical use of ὅπερ ἔστιν in the 
context of relative terms. The elenchus of Agathon includes a discussion where 
Socrates argues, on the basis of the relativity of ‘desire’, that love is not beautiful: 
love is the desire for beauty; we only desire what we lack; so, love must lack beauty 
and, therefore, is not beautiful. In the course of that argument, Socrates discusses the 
defining characteristics of relative terms and some examples. He puts a formula for 
whether something is a relative as a question: ‘Is Eros of such a kind as to be of 
something or of nothing?’ (199d1–2).24 He continues with an analogical case: ‘is the 
father father of something or not?’ (199d5).25 Socrates supplies the answer that the 
                                                
23 See Peterson, 'Greatest' and Rickless, Transition, 85–93. 
24 ἐστι τοιοῦτος οἷος εἶναί τινος ὁ Ἔρως ἔρως, ἢ οὐδενός; 
25 ἆρα ὁ πατήρ ἐστι πατήρ τινος ἢ οὔ; 
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father is father of a son or daughter.26 In this way, he puts the term ‘father’ into the 
same class as the term ‘Eros’.  
Socrates continues with the case of ‘brother’, another relative term, and 
specifies it in the following manner: ‘ἀδελφός, αὐτὸ τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἔστιν’ (199e3–4). 
Literally, the expression means ‘brother, the actual thing that it is’ and is glossed as 
‘brother qua brother’ by Dover.27 The gloss can be used, but with care: qua is a term 
of art in modern philosophy of language and epistemology, which specifies the aspect 
under which something is considered.28 One might say that Hume’s dialogues qua 
philosophy are lucid, but qua literature are obscure. The qua qualifier allows us to 
specify how we are thinking of an object and different ways of thinking of an object 
may result in incompatible descriptions being true of an item.29 In none of the uses I 
can find in Plato does he use the qualifier in this ‘multiple aspect’ way, so, we must 
handle Dover’s gloss carefully. Whereas in modern philosophy, qua is used to 
introduce and to exclude aspects under which something may be considered, Plato, as 
we will see, uses the expression only to exclude aspects from consideration, never to 
introduce them. The only use Plato would allow is: ‘Hume’s dialogues qua dialogues 
are thus–and–so’. This statement warns us not to think of Hume’s dialogues as 
literature, nor as philosophy, but only as dialogues. 
To prove the point about ὅπερ ἔστιν let us look at its occurrence at Theaetetus 
204e11. Socrates is trying, in the face of determined resistance, to force Theaetetus to 
                                                
26 ὁ πατήρ, the Greek formula with a definite article, is a way of speaking generally about 
fathers. I have retained the definite article in English for the sake of literalism, even though it 
sounds archaic.     
27 K.J. Dover, et al. Symposium. (Cambridge, 1980), 134. 
28 Aristotle is often thought to be the originator of this use of ᾖ, from which we derive the qua 
qualifier, but see Empedocles B17, line 9 in DK. This line is also line 8 of Empedocles 26 in 
DK. 
29 Alternatively, it may be that the descriptions are true of the ordered pair of the item and 
way of thinking, i.e. the properties being lucid and being obscure apply respectively to the 
ordered pairs <Hume’s dialogues, philosophy> and <Hume’s dialogues, literature>. In this 
case the descriptions would be true or false of different ordered pairs and so not incompatible.  
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accept that the ‘whole’ (τὸ ὅλον) and the ‘sum’ (πᾶν) mean the same. Socrates says 
that if a whole consisted of parts, it would be all the parts. Something that is all the 
parts is a sum. So the ‘whole’ and ‘sum’ mean the same. ‘Or is a part what it is of 
anything other than the whole?’.30 Socrates here moves to exclude the possibility that 
the part should be considered under another aspect, say, the aspect of being a 
functional part of a structured whole, such as a hand of somebody. Under that aspect, 
the ‘part’ might be relative to a body, as well as relative to a whole. But Socrates’ 
point is to exclude the other possible aspects of the item, and consider it just qua part. 
Note also that the ὅπερ ἐστίν is again used in the context of relative terms: the part is 
part of the whole.  
This suggests that, for Plato, a relative is always relative to some correlative. 
The part is always relative to the whole, properly construed, and, to return to the 
Republic IV examples, the larger is always larger than the smaller. But is the 
relationship between relative and correlative exclusive? That is, is the relative only 
relative to the reciprocating correlative, or could it be relative to something else as 
well? This is not obvious: it seems that a larger thing is not only larger than a smaller 
thing, but also larger than a middle-sized thing. The ὅπερ ἔστιν move can help us 
here as well. Plato is concerned with the proper correlative of the larger. Whatever the 
larger is larger than will be smaller than the larger. In other words, if we properly 
specify the larger qua larger, not larger qua a larger thing, we see that it is relative 
only to the smaller. Indeed, this qua indicates that the necessary and sufficient 
condition on being larger is being larger than the smaller. Any relationships in 
addition to the relationship to the smaller, such as to a middle-sized thing, are 
redundant when explaining why the larger is larger.  
                                                
30 μέρος δ' ἔσθ' ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ὅλου; Theaetetus, 204e11. 
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We can see from looking at other passages where Plato uses this terminology 
that it regularly specifies that something should be viewed qua itself; it is used to 
exclude other incidental ways of looking at the relative, for example, under a non–
relative description. In the context of the Parmenides, we should be alive to the sense 
in which Parmenides uses it. In so far as someone is a slave, he must be slave of 
something. The point is to differentiate a relative description such as ‘slave’ from 
another, non–relative, description which will apply to all slaves, for example, ‘being 
human’ or ‘being an offspring’. If this is the thought, it prefigures Aristotle’s 
discussion at Cat. 7 7a31–b9. There Aristotle remarks that when all the possible 
‘accidental’ (συμβεβηκότα) descriptions are excluded, or ‘stripped away’ from a 
master, such as ‘being a biped’, ‘being capable of reason’, we will say that a slave is a 
slave of a master. His point is that it is, if not exactly false, not ideal to say that ‘a 
slave is slave of a biped’; he would prefer a more perspicuous designation of the 
correlative.31 The Parmenides’ use of εἰσὶν αἵ εἰσιν could be understood to make the 
same point: a master qua master, is master of a slave and a slave, qua slave, is slave 
of a master. When properly specified, master and slave are reciprocal correlatives, 
which means that a master is always and only of a slave and the relative-correlative 
relationship is necessary and sufficient for being a master. 
So my broader view highlights two elements of Plato’s account of relatives. 
First, when properly specified, a relative will relate to a correlative. A master, when 
                                                
31 συμβεβηκός has a range of uses in Aristotle but Physics II.3 195a33-b6 may be the closest 
parallel. There Aristotle is discussing, not kinds of cause, but the ways in which a cause may 
be given: ‘…some [are causes] as accident (ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς) and some the genera of 
these’ (195a31-33). He then gives the example of a sculptor causing a sculpture. The cause of 
a sculpture can be given as ‘a sculptor’, ‘Polyclitus’ or even ‘a man’ or ‘an animal’. The cause 
can be picked out in various ‘accidental’ ways. This closely reflects the thought in Categories 
7a31–b9 that a relative can be specified in various ways. Moreover, the Physics tells us that 
there is a hierarchy of ways of specifying the cause with respect to the caused (195b1-2). 
Similarly, the Categories says that there is a privileged description of the relative with respect 
to the correlative. 
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specified as such, will relate to a slave. The relationship between a relative and 
correlative is exclusive and exhaustive. Second, the correlative will be the object of 
the relative term. In the example from Republic IV, the relative term, knowledge, is 
relative to the object of knowledge, the knowable.  
Understanding P2 with the help of a richer grasp of relativity in Plato allows 
us to properly understand the principles that I labelled above as (A) and (B). (A) 
asserts that, for any pair of reciprocal correlatives, if one is a Form, both are Forms 
and (B) asserts that, for any pair of reciprocal correlatives, if one is a participant, both 
are participants. If this is the correct way to construe the principles of separation as 
they appear in the GD, the argument of the GD works in the following manner.  
 First, P1 makes the general point that the Forms are separate, in some sense, 
from participants. This claim has been in play from as far back as 128e5 when 
Socrates posited Forms that, unlike participants, are not themselves subject to being 
alike and not alike or one and many. Second, P2 picks out a restricted class of the 
Forms, namely the Forms of relative terms. Each of such terms has a reciprocal 
correlative: relative terms and their correlatives come in pairs. Third, as I have argued 
above, P2 is best characterised as asserting that separation amounts to AB, i.e. that 
both items in a relative-correlative pair are isolated together in either the Form realm 
or in our realm.  
 With these three premises in place, Parmenides can derive the four 
consequences when he turns to his example relative-correlative pairs: master/slave 
and knowledge/truth. Parmenides says:  
 
If one of us is somebody’s master or somebody’s slave, surely he is not 
[a slave] of Master itself, of what a master is, nor is the master a master 
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of Slave itself, of what a slave is. On the contrary, because he is a 
human being he is it [viz. a master or a slave] of a human being; 
Mastery itself is what it is of Slavery itself (αὐτὴ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς 
δουλείας ἐστὶν ὅ ἐστι), and similarly Slavery itself [is what it is] of 
Mastery itself (133d7–e4). 
 
Parmenides tells Socrates that a human master can only be master of a human slave, 
and the equivalent is true for the corresponding Forms. It is irrelevant, for example, to 
Achilles’ property of being a master that he bears any other relationships: these can be 
‘stripped away’ to use Aristotle’s metaphor. It is necessary and sufficient for being a 
master that Achilles bears the appropriate relationship to some slave.  
 But, according to Plato’s conception of relatives, the correlative is not just 
that in virtue of which something is a master; the correlative is also the object of the 
relation. And by AB any correlation holds only between items in the same realm. So 
the correlative object of any relative term cannot be in a different realm to the subject 
of the relative. From here, the four consequences follow directly: a divine master 
cannot be master of a human slave; the Form Slave cannot be the object of human 
mastery. The same is true for knowledge: for a state of mind to be knowledge, it is 
necessary and sufficient that it bear a relationship to the correlative of knowledge. 
But, because the correlative of a relative and the object of a relative are identical for 
Plato, and AB, knowledge in the Form realm can only be knowledge of things in that 
realm; similarly, we cannot know the Form Truth.32  
 The above construal of the argument shows that separation, construed as AB, 
along with Plato’s usual notion of relative terms, jeopardise three key Platonic 
                                                
32 This way of reading the argument owes a great deal to conversations with James Warren. 
However, he cannot be held responsible for the results! 
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propositions. This invites us to read Parmenides’ attack as a reductio ad absurdum of 
AB, combined with certain assumptions about relatives, which Parmenides is sure the 
young Socrates will accept.33 This account does not make GD beg the question, unlike 
the radical separation reading. My reading does not assume that no relations are 
possible across realms, but rather shows why relative and correlative pairs cannot 
relate across the realms. If Plato thinks of relative terms in the GD as he usually 
thinks of relatives, then there cannot be cross-realm correlations. If there cannot be 
cross-realm correlations, the four consequences listed above follow. At least three of 
these consequences threaten fundamental Platonic tenets: that the Forms are 
knowable, that the divine can master us, and that the divine can know our affairs.34 
 The aim of this paper was to show, contrary to the view of many, that the GD 
is correctly targeted and is not formally invalid, at least for the reasons usually given. 
I argued in section 1.1 that the radical separation reading should be rejected as it 
makes the GD a petitio principii and fails to explain why Parmenides would to beg 
the question. Section 1.2 showed that the argument is not formally invalid, because it 
is best read as having four consequences, two concerning vassalage and two 
epistemological. It is not the case that the epistemological conclusions are arrived at 
                                                
33 If we read the argument this way, there is still a question over which claim or claims 
Socrates might reject: would he reject AB, or his (assumed) views of relatives? A full answer 
to that question is beyond the scope of this paper, but it seems that Plato has the Parmenides 
conception of relatives in the (probably) later work, the Sophist, at 255c14. This may suggest 
that he would retain his conception of relative terms. See my M. Duncombe, 'Plato’s Absolute 
and Relative Categories at Sophist 255c14', ['Categories'] Ancient Philosophy 32 (2012), 77–
86. 
34 There is one possible objection to my reading of the GD. On the face of it, ‘knowledge’ and 
‘truth’ are not related as ‘master’ is to ‘slave’: although it is impossible to know without 
knowing truths, it is perfectly possible for there to be a truth that is not known.  Put another 
way, to be a reciprocal pair, these should be ‘knowledge’ (ἡ ἐπιστήμη) and the ‘knowable’ 
(τὸ ἐπιστητόν), which are the terms Aristotle uses (Cat. 6b34). Briefly, I think that ‘truth’ 
should be understood here as ‘object of knowledge’ or ‘the knowable’, which would be a 
proper correlative for ‘knowledge’. Theaetetus 201d2–3, Republic 438c6–9 and 438e5 all 
show that Plato is developing a vocabulary for ‘object of knowledge’ while avoiding τὸ 
ἐπιστητόν. For further argument on this point, see my Duncombe, 'Categories', 84–5. 
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by analogy with the arguments concerning vassalage. So it is not an argument from 
analogy and does not fall to the objections levelled at it when understood that way. 
Finally, in section 2 I used an understanding of Plato’s wider view of relatives to 
argue that the GD is a legitimate reductio, showing that certain assumptions lead to 
Platonically unacceptable consequences concerning the relationship of us to the 
divine and of the divine to us.  
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